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Abstract
This paper presents a research agenda for crowd
behavior research by drawing from the
organizational control literature. It addresses the
need for research into the organizational and social
structures that guide user behavior and contributions
in crowd-based platforms. Crowd behavior is
situated within a conceptual framework of
organizational control. This framework helps
scholars more fully articulate the full range of
control mechanisms operating in crowd-based
platforms, contextualizes these mechanisms into the
context of crowd-based platforms, challenges existing
rational assumptions about incentive systems, and
clarifies theoretical constructs of organizational
control to foster stronger integration between
information systems research and organizational and
management science.

1. Introduction
Organizations are increasingly interested in
harnessing the collective actions of crowds to meet
business goals [1]. This has resulted in the
proliferation of crowd-based platforms supporting
collective intelligence and crowdsourcing efforts that
coordinate the contribution of user-generated
content—product reviews, encyclopedia articles, and
current traffic conditions. Consequently, the crowd
has become a powerful source of knowledge that
guides not only the decisions of the public, but also
decisions made by organizations [2]. As
organizations like Amazon, Waze, and Wikipedia
turn to the crowd to produce the content that their
business models depend on, the challenge of how to
motivate and govern the crowd has become the topic
of much research [1, 3]. While there is scholarly
interest in the “actions and policies employed to
effectively manage the crowd and steer them” [4],
there remains limited research about effective
mechanisms for governing the crowd [5].
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Crowd-based platforms coordinate action through
decomposing tasks and encouraging individuals to
participate by providing intrinsic (e.g., fun,
enjoyment) and/or extrinsic (e.g., status, money,
social interaction, etc.) motivators [3]. Three recent
Information Systems (IS) reviews of crowdsourcing
research [6, 4, 7] emphasize the importance of
designing effective incentive systems. However,
research on motivation is somewhat disparate, with
various categorizations and often inconsistent
findings as to which incentives are the most effective
[4]. Moreover, this approach can be limited by its
often deterministic and rational assumptions of user
behavior and motivation, which overlooks normative
and social aspects of human behavior [8]. To more
fully understand the dynamics of crowd behavior and
governance of crowd-based projects, IS researchers
need a sophisticated way to conceptualize the
complex social and organizational processes that
guide the behavior and actions of the crowd.
To fill this conceptual gap in the crowd behavior
literature, this paper draws from organizational
control research. Organizational control refers to the
strategies used by managers to align worker
behaviors to organizational objectives [9, 10]. While
IS scholars have occasionally focused on
organizational control mechanisms [11, 12, 13], an
explicit consideration of control mechanisms is
particularly limited in the crowdsourcing and
collective intelligence literature.
This paper makes four contributions to the
literature. First, I present a framework that more fully
articulates the range of control mechanisms that
guide the behavior of the crowd. Second, I
contextualize this framework through providing
examples of organizational control research in
crowd-based platforms. Third, I identify promising
new directions for crowd behavior research by
bringing in the ontologically and methodologically
diverse organizational control literature [14]. Fourth,
this paper clarifies theoretical constructs of
organizational control in order to foster integrative
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research drawing from both IS and organizational
science literature.

2. Organizational Control and Crowds
This section defines organizational control,
summarizes an input-process-output model of
organizational control, and describes resistance to
organizational control.

2.1. What is Organizational Control?
While IS researchers often note the ‘loss of
control’ associated with crowdsourcing [5], control is
a fundamental aspect of all organizations and is
needed to coordinate goal-oriented behaviors [15]. As
will be described below, crowd-based platforms use a
diverse range of control mechanisms. Organizational
control includes the mechanisms used by managers to
direct, motivate, and encourage worker behaviors to
align with organizational objectives [9, 10]. The need
for organizational control stems from the competing
interests that exist between individuals and
organizations, which can be resolved though control
mechanisms (e.g., rules, rewards, punishments,
supervision, etc.) that subordinate the individual’s
goals to those of the organization. Control strategies
include the incentives that motivate some behaviors
(e.g., incentive systems) and also the mechanisms
that constrain other behaviors.
Various control mechanisms are used by
organizations, including policies [16], bureaucratic
rules [17], culture [18], incentive systems and
supervision [19], identity [20], and technological
design [9]. Scholars have offered several approaches
to categorizing these control strategies [9, 10, 21, 22],
though most distinguish between formal and informal
control strategies [22, 11].
Formal control strategies (also called rational
control) seek to influence behavior through the
explicit and codified structuring of inputs, tasks,
processes, behaviors, and/or outcomes—in essence
providing incentives in return for completing welldesigned tasks within certain parameters or punishing
those that deviate from this organizationally designed
process. This forms the basis for the incentives
systems currently used by many crowd-based
platforms. Additionally, behavior can be directed
through bureaucratic rules, direct supervision, and
technological design. These control strategies are
premised on the assumptions that individuals are
primarily rational and view work as an economic
exchange, and that there is a generally linear cause-

and-effect relationship between incentives and action
[22].
By contrast, informal control strategies (also
called normative or social control) seek to guide
behaviors through fostering collective norms,
identity, culture, and values in members. A
theoretically and ontologically diverse range of
scholars have considered these kinds of informal
control strategies [23, 21, 20, 9, 24, 14, 25]. In
general, socio-ideological control occurs when
individuals are socialized into an organization’s
system of beliefs, values, and norms (i.e., corporate
culture), which provides a particular organizational
reality that acts as a sense-making device for member
behaviors. When these values and norms are
internalized, members can monitor their own
behaviors to ensure that they align with
organizational goals. Informal control mechanisms
are particularly useful for knowledge work, where
required creativity, ambiguity, and flexibility are not
conducive to bureaucratic control strategies that
dictate a rule for every contingency [26]. Still,
control strategies often do not fit firmly in one of
these two categories, and a single mechanism may
possess attributes of both formal and informal
strategies [10, 21].

2.2. Framework of Organizational Control
A recent synthesis of organizational control
research uses an input, process, output (IPO) model
to produce a useful model for conceptualizing the
various mechanisms in a control system [10]. This
framework classifies control systems on the degree to
which formal and informal control mechanisms target
the input, behavior, and output of the system. It
presents a control system as comprised of several
control
mechanisms
(e.g.,
bureaucratic,
technological, direct, socio-ideological, etc.) that
each have a control target (e.g., input, behavior,
output) in the organization. Input targets include
mechanisms that control how inputs (e.g., who is
allowed to participate) to the system are qualified,
chosen, and prepared, such as through the selection,
training, and socialization of individuals. Behavior
targets focus on controlling the manner in which
individuals perform actions or complete tasks.
Finally, output targets include mechanisms that
control qualitative and quantitative outcomes, such as
profits, quality standards, production volume, and
speed. This framework draws attention to the various
control mechanisms that collectively comprise a
control system.
Most IS research on crowd behavior has focused
on the study of formal control mechanisms (i.e.,

1728

incentive systems) that target the outputs produced by
the crowd [4]. By contrast, little scholarly attention
has been directed towards control mechanisms that
target inputs (e.g., who is included and excluded from
participating, socialization and training, etc.) and
behaviors (e.g., how and when contributions are
produced).
Additionally,
informal
control
mechanisms have been understudied in the context of
crowd behavior, if mentioned at all. Finally, little
research has addressed how several control strategies
may work in tandem to control crowd behavior, an
approach that is advocated for by organizational
scholars [21, 26, 27].

2.3. Resistance to Organizational Control
Control is often implicitly considered a
straightforward—even deterministic—process by
scholars, whereby the application of proper control
mechanisms produce desired user behavior. This is
reflected in IS studies suggesting that “task designers
must guess at the right combination of incentives and
iterate until success” [3] or simply identify the “right
incentive mechanism” [4] for encouraging
participation. However, other scholars challenge this
rational deterministic view of control by questioning
the assumption that “control is achieved by designing
and applying appropriate structures, procedures,
measures and targets; and, relatedly, that resistance to
these mechanisms is symptomatic of `poor design’ or
`poor management’ that can be rectified by
restructuring” [20].
Critical approaches to organizational control, by
contrast, view organizations as socially constructed
and as sites of power and resistance [14], where
divergent interests among stakeholders often
provokes subversion, protest, sabotage, and other
deviant behaviors [28, 29, 30, 31, 32]. Indeed,
conflict and struggle may be as commonplace in
crowds as compliance and consent. Yet resistance as
core aspect of organizational life is overlooked in
crowd behavior research, where participation is often
conceived of as binary—individuals participate or
they do not. By focusing scholarly attention to the
struggles experienced by various stakeholders, we
can better understand the full range of stakeholder
experiences in these platforms and design more
humane and democratic platforms.
A recent example underscores the less visible
actions of control and resistance that occur in crowdbased platforms. Waze is a GPS-based navigation
application for smartphones that incorporates realtime user-reported accidents, traffic, and police cars
to optimize routes. When a detour consistently
rerouted traffic through a previously quiet

neighborhood, local residents began posting false
reports during rush hour in effort to redirect traffic
away [33]. However, these acts of resistance were
suppressed through two organizational control
mechanisms. First, other Waze users were able to
invalidate the false reports through submitting their
own report. Second, an algorithm used data
transmitted by the smartphone (e.g., speed, direction,
etc.) to suspend the user accounts of those suspected
of submitting false reports. Together, these control
mechanisms were sufficient to overcome the
resistance efforts of these stakeholders and
marginalize their interests. Given the scale at which
crowd-based platforms operate, the question of how
control systems produce winners and losers as
stakeholders struggle over divergent goals becomes
an important area of study.

3. Organizational Control Mechanisms
A summary of formal and informal control
mechanisms is presented. Examples of crowd-based
platforms are provided, drawing from studies that
explicitly or implicitly embody these control
mechanisms. This reveals a variety of yet
unconsidered control mechanisms currently used in
crowd-based platforms.

3.1. Bureaucratic Control
Bureaucratic control relies on impersonal and
formal system of rules, procedures, and roles to guide
worker behavior [17], although some rules may also
be informal. Such systems can, for example, dictate
the kinds of people selected for a task, the manner by
which tasks are supposed to be completed, the kinds
of behaviors that are acceptable, and how
performance is evaluated, rewarded, and punished.
Often organizational control is achieved by explicitly
linking worker behaviors to sanctions or rewards,
targeting extrinsic and intrinsic motivators of these
individuals [34]. Extrinsic motivation induces
cooperation through the promise of instrumental
benefits, such as money, status, or reputation.
Conversely, intrinsic motivation results from
individuals cooperating due to the task being
personally rewarding, such as enjoyment, fun, and
altruism.
The use of bureaucratic control is identifiable in
many crowd-based platforms, as rule-based
contributions are used to coordinate the collective
action of unconnected individuals. Other rules may
motivate participation by providing clear guidelines
or criteria for achieving certain symbols of status
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(e.g., badges or titles) or earning rewards (e.g.,
money). Alternatively, individuals may participate
more when they know that their contributions are
quantified and made visible on their profile. A recent
literature review concluded that studies of incentive
systems and motivation are among the most studied
aspects of crowd behavior in the IS literature [4]. Yet,
these findings are often inconsistent, with it
remaining unclear which, if any, of these intrinsic
and extrinsic incentives are the most important for
recruiting and fostering participation.
Two important observations about crowd
behavior research arise from these findings. First,
extant IS research focuses heavily on incentives that
target outputs where participants are rewarded for
their contributions with status, recognition, badges, or
money. Less often examined are formal rules that
target inputs (e.g., who gets to participate) or
behaviors (e.g., how people perform tasks) in the
system. Second, most research examines rules that
motivate certain actions, while overlooking formal
rules act to constrain other actions. As organizations
seek to adequately govern and control the crowd,
more research is needed to understand the extent to
which formal rules reward and punish, not just
outputs, but also inputs and behaviors.
3.1.1. Example of Bureaucratic Control. A
study of reviewers on Yelp reveals how bureaucratic
rules, in the form of the terms of service, impacts
crowd behavior. While Yelp promotes empowerment
and transparency through its online review system,
the terms of service disallow users from including
civic or political discourses in their reviews [35].
Kuehn describes how some participants on Yelp
“monitored and flagged political reviews that did not
fit Yelp’s terms of service” [36], which limited the
discursive agency available to users in their
evaluations on Yelp. This bureaucratic rule, enforced
through self-policing, suppressed and filtered reviews
deemed inappropriate by Yelp. These rules construct
Yelp as ‘‘not the place’’ for consumer politics despite
promoting itself as a platform for empowerment and
transparency. More importantly, users are
empowered to produce only the type of content that
aligns the objectives of the greater organization—the
crowd is not simply encouraged to contribute, but to
contribute the ‘right’ kind of content.
This study reveals an important, yet understudied,
way in which formal rules are used to constrain the
kind of content that is produced in a crowd-based
platform. Perhaps most interesting is that some users
chose to self-police the reviews to ensure that these
rules were being followed by others. This reveals that
not only did these members know about these rules,

but that they were also sufficiently internalized to the
point that they would self-police content despite no
clear incentive. A deeply unsatisfying explanation of
this behavior is that some members just happen to
take on extra tasks for no apparent reason. These
members are likely driven by commitment to the
organization and its goals through socio-ideological
control (described below) or perhaps the kind of
concertive control found in self-managed teams [24].
Here, the alignment of two different control
mechanisms work together to produce a control
system that discourages and eliminates certain kinds
of contributions to Yelp. However, this may also be a
cautionary lesson as organizational research reveals
that rules deemed ‘bad’ by members can also become
dysfunctional [37, 38, 39], leading individuals to
resist, engage in mischief, or leave the organization.
In other words, some formal rules may act as a
disincentive for participation.

3.2. Technological Control
Technological control is exercised through
organizational technologies that substitute for the
presence of direct supervision and constrains the
amount of discretion available to workers [40]. For
example, assembly lines can control the pace of work
in factories, while soda fountains at McDonald’s
dispense precisely the right amount of soda into cups
to eliminate waste [30]. Such mechanisms severely
limit the ability of workers to deviate from the
organizationally planned process, highlighting their
use in targeting the behavior of participants—
constraining how and when they work. Other
technologies can provide the constant threat of
surveillance, acting as an invisible supervisor that can
notify managers or take action when a worker
deviates from a task.
There are several ways in which technological
control can be exerted in crowd-based platforms.
Contractors on the digital labor market Upwork, for
example, can be surveilled by their employers
through recording their desktop screens while they
work. More recently, the use of algorithms has also
explored as a means of control [41, 42]. For example,
the Yelp filter automatically removes roughly 20% of
reviews submitted to the website that are suspicious
[43]. While this is done to remove fake or paid-for
reviews, it also may upset individuals that provided
honest opinions only to find them removed for an
unknown reason.
Technological control can also be linked to the
concept of affordances, which has been increasingly
used in the IS field [44, 45]. Affordances of a
technological artifact are the potentials for action
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perceived by an individual [45], which can be
mediated by group norms [46]. As a result,
affordances of technology are not viewed
deterministic, but rather accept that technologies can
be adopted in unintended ways by users. This has
been applied to crowdsourcing by IS researchers who
recognize that “design elements of a variety of
architectures that constrain and afford purposeful
human actions” [47]. In this sense, the affordances
designed into crowdsourcing platforms might act to
shape crowd behavior. Still, while affordances are
often conceived of as enabling and constraining
action, the explicit study of affordances (or lack
thereof) being strategically designed (or omitted)
from crowd platforms to further organizational goals
emerges as understudied.
3.2.1. Example of Technological Control. One
study investigating a peer feedback system on a
popular hospitality exchange website provides
insights to how technological control through
affordances may function in crowd-based platforms
[48]. This study found that the contribution of
negative feedback was inhibited by the affordances of
the system. Specifically, users of this website
reported that their negative experiences could not be
adequately explained within the 1,000 character limit
available for references and that the required labeling
of feedback as negative, neutral, or positive did not
align with their subjective experience. As a result,
many users did not feel empowered to contribute
their negative experiences. This contributed to the
overall positive bias of feedback on the system and
may have (intentionally or unintentionally) benefited
the organization because new members (and hence
income) were recruited through its advertised high
level of positive feedback. Interestingly, though,
these users resisted this technological control by
instead expressing negative experiences in the
discussion forums—a channel with different
technological affordances that did not restrict the
length of comments nor require labels. This shows
that users were willing to contribute the content of
their negative experiences, but that the technological
affordances of this platform restricted the kinds of
feedback that users were able to produce.

3.3. Direct Control
Direct control is generally enacted through a
formalized
hierarchical
supervisor-subordinate
relationship in which the supervisor has the
legitimate authority to instruct workers on what to do,
monitor their behavior, and reward and punish them

as needed. This definition suggests that it is unlikely
that direct supervision exists in crowdsourcing.
Indeed, scholars assert that crowdsourcing “implies
voluntary participation of individuals, with no
hierarchy or contract related
constraint …
[c]oordination by hierarchy does not take place” [49].
Other conceptualizations of crowdsourcing and
collective intelligence emphasize that lack of
hierarchy is a condition of crowdsourcing [1] and that
crowds lack direct supervision [3].
3.3.1. Example of Direct Control. Emerging
research, however, challenges the assumed lack of
direct supervision of the crowd. Several studies have
identified people holding the position of a community
manager operating in crowd-based platforms. In one
study, the community manager was found to play an
integral role in managing the production of usergenerated content. As Kerr and Kelleher explain,
“[w]hen share value depends on market share, unique
users, and clicks, companies are turning to a range of
techniques to “engage,” retain, and convert user
activity into revenue [including] the employment of
community managers” [50]. These community
managers were found to organize offline events,
manage problematic user behaviors, and deal with the
emotions of users. Other scholars found that
community managers monitor and control crowd
activity and “promote the participation and
collaboration of stakeholders in order to improve
some ‘crowdsourcing’ processes” [51]. Still,
relatively little is known about these community
managers and the extent to which they are effective.
They reveal, however, that as harnessing crowds has
become more central to organizations, more formal
and rational forms of direct control appear to be
implemented to guide crowd behaviors. It also
illustrates the importance considering how
unexpected forms of control may operate in crowdbased platforms.

3.4. Socio-Ideological Control
While previous control mechanisms are founded
on a rational approach to human behavior, socioideological control mechanisms stem from a
normative approach to control, in which the
organization can foster the development of beliefs
and values that workers are expected to internalize
and use as a guide for their behaviors [21]. Scholars
have noted a lack of conceptual consensus of
informal approaches
[10], contributing to
development of several overlapping theories of socioideological control, including corporate culture,
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cultural control [52, 53], clan mechanisms [9],
disciplinary control [54, 55], and identity-based
control [20, 23]. These theories are likewise
differentiated by their intellectual traditions and
ontological and epistemological orientations,
including structural functionalism, post-structuralism,
social constructivist, post-modernism, critical theory,
positivism, and interpretism.
Informal control mechanisms generally involve “a
process of reality construction that allows people to
see and understand particular events, actions, objects,
utterances, or situations in distinctive ways” [56].
Through discourse that shapes the organizational
reality of members, organizations can influence
behavior by guiding worker values, beliefs, norms,
taken-for-granted assumptions, concepts of right and
wrong, and good and bad. Ultimately, this serves to
eliminate or minimize the incongruence that exists
between individual and organizational goals.
Socio-ideological control mechanisms are less
obtrusive than rational control systems as they do not
rely on external structures of the organizations
(supervisors, technology, or rules). Rather, through a
strong culture or identity fostered through
organizational discourses, workers are encouraged to
monitor their own behavior to ensure that they make
decisions and actions that align with organizational
goals. This places emphasis on understanding how
language and organizational discourse (e.g., written
documents, speech, pictures, symbols, etc.) is drawn
upon by members to constitute their social reality and
organizational life [57]. Discourse can be thought of
as “a way of reasoning…anchored in a particular
vocabulary that constitutes a particular version of the
social world” [58], based in the assertion that
“language constructs organizational reality, rather
than simply reflects it” [59]. This emphasizes the
analysis of verbal and written communication
including organization stories [60, 61], rituals [62,
63], narratives [64], and metaphors [65] used by the
organization and shared among members and used as
a sense-making device [66]. Several recent studies
offer detailed accounts of socio-ideological control in
organizational contexts [67, 68, 69, 21].
One example of discourse constructing a certain
organizational reality can be found in the concept of
playbour (a play on the words play and labour) [70].
This occurs when organizations encourage
participants to understand their unpaid contributions
(such as unpaid video game modding) as ‘fun’ or a
‘hobby’, while the organization extracts value from
their efforts. Their labor is paradoxically “voluntarily
given and unwaged, enjoyed and exploited” [71].
This framing obscures other constructions of their
participation—such as volunteering, work, or

donating and suppresses the idea that they might be
deserving of payment.
Despite the popularity of investigating socioideological control mechanisms in the organizational
and managerial sciences, this is understudied in
studies of crowd behavior. Yet, IS scholars have
called for research to investigate the social processes
operating in crowd-based projects [8]. Moreover,
research demonstrating frequent communication
among crowd workers [72] and the employment of
community
managers
[51]
suggests
that
crowdsourcing platforms may be more social and
have greater organizational contact than sometimes
believed.
3.4.1. Example of Socio-Ideological Control. The
findings of a recent ethnography of the invite-only
Yelp Elite Squad implicitly speaks to how socioideological control functions in a crowd-based
platform [73]. The Yelp Elite Squad exists in cities
around the world, members of which spend
significant time visiting business, producing reviews,
and participating in online forum discussions. In
return, they are invited to free offline member-only
events each month. They are incidentally coordinated
by a community manager (CM), who is a trained and
paid employee of Yelp. The study describes how
discursive resources on the Yelp website and
communication by the community manager foster a
specific organizational reality. Elite Squad members
are constructed as community members through
discourse defining them as “the true heart of the Yelp
community” and “a local authority and role model for
the Yelp community” that has “got a lot of sway in
the community” [74]. Coinciding with this, members
reported that they strive to be Yelpy and Yelp-like,
which includes behaviors like representing Yelp well
to businesses, not demanding special treatment,
recruiting new members, producing high quality
reviews, and producing reviews often. Furthermore,
the construction of their participation as community
members was sufficiently powerful that when asked
about their role in Yelp’s business, members
responded saying that they simply had not considered
Yelp as a business or their labor as producing
financial value. One member said that, “I just feel
like, oh it’s just a fun community and you know, get
free dinners and it’s just like friends are in it . . . I see
Yelp as a community more than I do a business. Like,
I never really thought of it being a business” [73].
Several implications arise from considering the
Elite Squad from the perspective of socio-ideological
control. First, the desire to be ‘Yelpy’ suggests that
these individuals strongly identity with the
organization and have internalized a set of values and
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beliefs that guide their behavior, which leads to them
to self-monitor their actions even when they are not
supervised (e.g., not demanding special treatment).
How Yelp was able to achieve this becomes an
interesting scholarly question. Second, these
members
internalized
Yelp’s
version
of
organizational reality, in which their participation is
understood through a civic-minded framing of
‘community’, rather than as a volunteer or as rational
exchange with a for-profit business that financially
benefits from their unpaid labor. The discursive
resources that constitute the Elite Squad as a
community obscure how their labor financially
benefits Yelp—it was not until confronted with this
idea by the interviewer that members were able to
make sense of their participation differently. This
suggests that hegemony—a process of gaining the
active consent of a dominated group [75, 76]—and
related considerations of asymmetrical power
differences is a fruitful area of consideration for
further research. Third, it highlights that some crowdbased platforms require individuals to operate in
offline settings (e.g., visiting businesses to review)
where they are not as easily survailled by the
organization. Yet, the organization still has an
interest in controlling the behavior of participants in
these offline spaces. Here, disciplinary control, in
which members self-monitor their behavior [55, 54,
23], emerges a powerful mechanism of organizational
control. Fourth, it demonstrates that not all
individuals in the crowd are subject to the same
control mechanisms. Rather, there appears to be be
less visible sub-groups [77] operating in the crowd
subject to different mechanisms of organizational
control. Overall, this study brings attention to the
importance of considering discourse in the
investigation of informal control strategies in crowdbased platforms.

4. A Research Agenda for Crowd Behavior
Based on Organizational Control Theory
There is an assumption that crowd-based
platforms imply the loss of control by organizations
[2, 5]. However, by clarifying mechanisms of
organizational control and situating these within
empirical studies of crowd-based platforms, this
paper demonstrates that a diverse array of formal and
informal organizational control mechanisms do
indeed operate in this setting. Organizational control
scholars note that researchers are often too singular in
their conceptualizations and empirical focus when
studying control mechanisms, frequently choosing to
examine one type of control over others [10]. While

the IS literature has revealed much about incentive
systems [4] that target outputs, other types of formal
and informal control mechanisms have been
understudied. Yet these are critical aspects to
investigate as scholars and designers seek to
understand the best ways to govern the crowd.
To address this need, this paper encourages IS
scholars to consider the various formal and informal
control mechanisms operating at the input, behavior,
and output targets of crowd-based platforms [10].
Through applying these concepts to studies of various
crowd-based platforms, some key insights emerge.
While bureaucratic incentives systems that
encourage certain outputs emerged as the most
commonly studied type of control, far less examined
are the rules and policies that act to constrain crowd
behavior. Moreover, the study of self-policing at
Yelp [36] suggests that some control mechanisms
work in concert with each other (i.e., bureaucratic
and socio-ideological) to encourage some users to
flag content that deviates from what Yelp considers
appropriate. Effectively, a control system was
devised that encourages some users to flag and
remove content that deviates from organizationally
appropriate standards. This type of crowd behavior is
both incredibly interesting and understudied. Future
research may draw from concertive control literature
[24] and studies that examine the interplay of several
control mechanisms [21, 26] to further examine
similar phenomena.
In regard to technological control, a study of the
feedback system on a hospitality website revealed
that the design and absence of some affordances
acted to inhibit the contribution of negative reviews
[48]. This suggests that a promising vein of crowd
behavior research could more explicitly integrate the
technological affordances and materiality literature
[44, 46] in studies of organizational control.
Similarly, the use of algorithms to automate control is
likewise an emerging area of relevance to the
functioning of crowd-based platforms [41, 42].
Emerging research on community managers
suggests that some crowd-based platforms are using
direct control of crowd members through local paid
employees, who monitor and manage members of the
crowd [73, 50, 51]. Further research is needed to
clarity the role of these community managers and
how the crowd responds to and resists being managed
and managing each other. Still, this brings to focus
the need to better understand how control systems
evolve over time [10] on crowd-based platforms.
Informal control mechanisms emerged as
important and understudied in crowd-based
platforms. A study of the Elite Squad reveals strong
commitment and identification to Yelp [73].
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Moreover, how these members made sense of their
organizational reality was shown to be influenced
strongly by organizational discourse and discursive
resources. Just as an incentive system can encourage
certain behaviors through motivation, organizational
discourse can encourage certain behaviors through
constructing organizational realities and identities of
crowd members. Future research could adopt
discourse analysis [64, 57] to investigate how
organizational language constructs certain meanings
for participants and influences overall crowd
behavior.
Finally, this review of the literature reveals that
the power struggles inherent in organizational life
that manifest in resistance, hegemony, and
domination [29, 30, 14, 75] have largely been
unexamined in the crowd behavior literature. Yet,
examples presented in this paper illustrate the
struggles emerge over defining what kind of content
is appropriate [36, 35] or resisting the material
impacts of crowdsourcing technologies [33].
Research adopting a critical perspective [14] to
organizational control in crowd-based platforms
could provide valuable insights into these issues.
Limitations are present in this review. While an
effort was made to draw from literature investigating
a variety of crowd-based platforms (e.g., Amazon,
Reddit, etc.), research on Yelp is over-represented.
This is because studies that explicitly or implicitly
addressed issues relating to organizational control
were scarce in other platforms. Rather, studies of
these platforms would often examine large datasets of
what is produced by the crowd (e.g., reviews.). Far
fewer studies have investigated how this content is
produced by the crowd (e.g., interviews,
ethnography, etc.). The scarcity of these kinds of
studies underscores the need for further research
analyzing the important social and organizational
processes influencing crowd behavior. Ultimately,
this review leads to a range of interesting research
questions:
•

•

What is the full array of control mechanisms
used in crowd-based platforms and how do they
influence participation? How do control
mechanisms enable and constrain the content
produced by the crowd? How do various control
mechanisms reinforce or contradict each other
and how are these resolved? How do control
mechanisms evolve over time and how does the
crowd respond to changes?
Who are the stakeholders in crowd-based
platforms and what are their goals? What
tensions arise from divergent stakeholder goals
and how are they resolved? What is the ‘right’

•

•

kind of content produced by the crowd and who
defines this? To what extent can control be
resisted? How do control mechanisms produce
winners and losers?
What are the similarities and differences between
control systems in traditional organizations and
crowd-based platforms?
What emergent or organizationally constructed
socio-ideological norms guide crowd behavior?
How are identities of crowd members socially
constructed through organizational discourses?

In conclusion, many studies of crowd behavior
focus on a limited range of incentive systems. Less
frequent are investigations of the organizational and
social aspects that influence how and what content is
produced. This review presents the ontologically,
theoretically, and methodological diverse literature of
organizational control as a promising framework for
investigating these aspects of crowd behavior. This
review also encourages a more careful consideration
of the term crowd and its popularization as an
alternative to organizations. While crowd highlights
many of the novel and different aspects of crowdbased platforms, it may also act to obscure from
scholars the more traditional organizational structures
that operate in crowd-based platforms. Scholars can
build a more complete understanding of the complex
sociotechnical processes influencing crowd behavior
by remaining open to discovering unexpected control
mechanisms operating in this context. While much
can be learned about crowds by examining how they
are different from organizations, there is also value in
examining how they are similar.
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